Introduction
Europe is confronted with what is invariably referred to as a 'crisis': an ongoing influx of refugees mainly but not exclusively from Syria. Although the root cause of flight -the brutal Syrian civil war -rages already for five years, Europe appears to have been caught by surprise as a result of which individual states resort to taking unilateral measures with a view to stemming the flow. A rather popular measure appears to be the hasty erection of fences. The fall of the Berlin wall, long a symbol of a profound division within Europe, has been forgotten and new grim divisions are created: this time not to prevent people from leaving but to prevent them from entering and accessing protection. Barbed wire fences and walls have been erected within a very short time between Hungary and Serbia, Hungary and Croatia, Greece and Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia, Bulgaria and Turkey, and Greece and Turkey. 1 Other unilateral measures include the recently adopted Danish law that allows the seizure of assets (money and valuables exceeding 1300 euro) from incoming refugees, 2 and the quotum set by Austria regarding the maximum number of refugees who may apply for asylum: 127,500 refugees within four years (i.e., 37,000 per year). 3 The EU too appears to be in disarray: attempts to relieve Greece and Italy by relocating 160,000 refugees within Europe proceeded so slowly that the President of the European Commission predicted that, at this pace, the relocation could only be realized by the year 2101; 4 the EU 'hotspots' in Italy and Greece were estab- 
Some historical observations
'Today's system of international refugee protection was born out of the Holocaust '. 18 This is a very short and unambiguous summary of the origin, and simultaneously the rationale, of the current international legal regime pertaining to refugees made by the then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Madame Ogata.
The 1951 Convention, the heart of today's system, was the first human rights treaty drafted after the Second World War, and it defines protection in terms of human rights. Since its origin is cast in terms of the genocide that took place during World War II, it is worth recalling that attempts to save the persecuted Jews came to naught preceding and during that War. Preceding World War Two, many attempted to flee Germany, but they were not welcome abroad. The Evian conference in 1938, which sought to find a solution for the German-Jewish refugees, failed, and the 908 Jewish refugees on board the ocean liner St. Louis that left Hamburg in 1939 were prevented from disembarking in Havana and Miami and were returned to Europe.
Those events resemble what we are now witnessing: many European states closing their borders to refugees, thousands of refugees trying -too often in vain -to reach Europe by boat, and arduous negotiations in the EU to reach (too late, too modest, and legally and morally questionable) solutions. All this despite the fact that Europe has, unlike the past, a refugee Convention -not to mention the common European asylum system -that was meant to address problems such as these. There are other uneasy parallels between the current situation and that of the pre-1939 refugees. First, the root cause of flight:
"The similarity in both instances -pre 1939 refugees and post 1945 refugees -there was no direct threat of annihilation (also not in the time of the St. Louis). The Syrians run from IS -at least as great an imminent threat as the pre 1939 and post 1945 refugees. Assad and IS have very little scruples, they will happily destroy everyone they consider to be problematic". 19 Secondly, the way the refugees are perceived:
'The international community is looking at the hundreds of thousands, and they are unfortunately stuck with a not inconsiderable fear because of their 
Morality
The 1951 Convention recognizes in its Preamble that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries and that a satisfactory solution to the problem, which the United Nations has recognized as being international in scope and nature, cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation. This preambular phrase is not binding nor does it have a binding counterpart in the body of the Convention. Geographical proximity, buttressed by the prohibition of refoulement, 21 therefore serves as the sole distributive mechanism. As a result, neighbouring states are disproportionately burdened, and there is no obligation for other states to relieve them.
The fact of disproportionate burdens is not new: Pakistan was for some 30 years the state hosting most of the world's refugees -it hosted many millions of Afghan refugees, and it still does (whilst not being a party to the 1951 Convention). Furthermore, 86% of the world's refugees are hosted by developing countries and 25% of the global total by the least developed states, 22 but these facts never induced addressing this systemic omission in the 1951 Convention.
In Europe, the lack of a distributive mechanism is compounded by the Dublin regulation that causes the states that form the outer border of the EU, particularly Greece and Italy, to be disproportionately burdened within the EU without other EU member states unburdening them. 23 Naturally, the interests of states are different from those of individuals, but what appears to be lacking in the current debates is recognition of the arbitrariness of the fate of individuals: no one can choose his or her place of birth; it is an accident of the human condition. International human rights law is an attempt to even out the unequal condition and chances of individual persons. International refugee law is a mechanism that ensures that the subject -the country of origin -who is responsible to accomplish this (in terms of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights) is substituted by another state -the country of refuge -for the duration of need for protection. In other words, the instruments that were adopted in the wake of the Second World War are permeated by the decision to protect individuals by means of human rights and in addition to secure this protection from another, substitute or back-up state for those -refugees -who are forced to flee the (anticipated) sustained or systematic violation of those human rights in their country of origin. 25
Conclusions drawn from a vantage point of view
The decision to ensure substitute protection for refugees in the sense indicated appears to have been forgotten. 26 Yet if the number of refugees is taken into consideration, particularly set against the number of Europeans, there is no reason to do so. Of course, there are many practical considerations and concerns that need to be addressed, not in the least that of ensuring an end to the extremely perilous way to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and legitimate fears about safety. 27 But in final analysis, Europe should observe its international obligations, 28 live up to its own standards 29 -which were not solely meant to be applied in good times but are arguably intended to ensure protection in bad times -and, in addition, share the responsibility of protecting those who are entitled to that protection in an equitable manner. Hannah Arendt observed in 1943 that:
'The comity of European peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest member to be excluded and persecuted '. 30 There is a risk that this comity may shatter once again, this time not on account of exclusion of a member but on account of a turning away from the rule of law that was created in the wake of the Second World War to prevent exactly that from recurring.
